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AND THE WORD FOR TODAY IS "IMMUNITY":
A LOOK AT SELECTED CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
AND § 1983 CASES FROM THE SUPREME
COURT'S 1997-98 TERM*
Melissa L. Koehnt
My interest in procedure, particularly how procedures can affect decisions on
substantive issues, fuels two of my teaching interests-§ 1983 and adjudicatory
criminal procedure.' Teaching in these areas requires, of course, staying on top of
the latest word from the Supreme Court. In its 1997-98 term, the Supreme Court
issued a hodge podge of disparate opinions in these two areas. Rather than catalog
these diverse cases, I will focus only on those that cluster around the concept of
immunity.2
Anyone who has worked with § 1983 cases knows that immunity is a crucial
concept. Before an attorney can even draft a proper complaint, she must wade
through the intricacies of the Court's immunity jurisprudence to determine who can
be a defendant and under what circumstances. To put it another way, she must know
who can be sued in what capacity and when. While the Supreme Court did not issue
any earthshaking immunity decisions this term, it did reiterate a number of important
rulings. These reiterations should help clarify and alleviate any lingering confusions
on the part of the lower federal courts.
Immunity is not a topic we normally think of in connection with' criminal
proceedings. Although there are the occasional cases of diplomatic immunity, none
were on the Court's docket this term. Immunity does, however, regularly arise in the
context of two constitutional provisions: the Fifth Amendment's clause prohibiting
self-incrimination 3 and the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against double jeopardy.'
* Based on remarks delivered at the Conference, Practitioners' Guide to the October 1997 Term of the United
States Supreme Court, at the University of Tulsa College of Law, December 11, 1998.
t Assistant Professor, University ofTulsa College ofLaw; J.D. 1992, University ofMichigan; B.A. 1989, Trinity
University.
1. This is the third year I have spoken at Tulsa's annual program. The first year I focused on habeas corpus
procedures, see Melissa L. Kochn, A Line in the Sand: The Supreme Court and the Writ offHabeas Corpus, 32 TULSA
LJ. 389 (1997), and last year I focused on § 1983 decisions, see Melissa L. Koehn, The NewAmerican Caste System:
the Supreme Court and Discrimination Among Civil Rights Plaintiffs, 32 MIcH. J. L. RaE. 49 (1998).
2. In addition to the § 1983 and criminal procedure cases, the Court also had on its docket another type of
immunity case: one involving tribal sovereign immunity. See Kiowa v. Manufacturing Technologies, 118 S. Ct. 1700
(1998). Because this case is essentially a breach of contract action, as opposed to a criminal proceeding or a § 1983
suit, it is outside the scope of this essay. For a brief discussion of Kiowa, see Judith V. Royster, Decontextualizing
Federal Indian Law: The Supreme Court's 1997-98 Term, 34 TULSA LJ. 329 (1999).
265
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The Fifth Amendment's self-incrimination provision is basically an immunity from
having to open your mouth and speak the words which might help convict you. The
Double Jeopardy Clause is, at its essence, also an immunity provision. Put very
basically, if the state has already subjected you to one criminal proceeding, you are
thereafter immune from a second one (with, of course, certain exceptions). The
Court's two Fifth Amendment decisions were not really surprising, although its two
double jeopardy opinions did contain a few mild (but only mild) surprises.
Indeed, "surprise," or the lack thereof, is the second theme of this article. The
Supreme Court's immunity decisions spark reactions ranging from no surprise to
merely mild surprise. There just was not much there that was hotly contested or
unexpected.' That is not to say, however, that the Court's decisions are unimportant.
In fact, many of them have a great deal of practical significance and others signal that
the Court is definitely moving in a new direction.
I. THE § 1983 IMMUNITY DECISIONS
"Section 1983" is a short hand way of referencing suits filed under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. That statute provides a procedural mechanism for filing complaints alleging
that a state actor has violated someone's federally protected rights.6 Most commonly,
§ 1983 is used to sue states and state employees who violate, or allegedly violate, the
plaintiff's constitutional rights.7 In its 1997-98 term, the Supreme Court decided nine
§ 1983 cases. Five of those decisions focused on immunity. Three of these immunity
decisions-Kalina v. Fletcher,8 Bogan v. Scott-Harris,9 and Wisconsin Department
of Corrections v. Schacht'--were straightforward and contained no surprises.
Indeed, all three were unanimous. The two other immunity decisions-Ohio Adult
Parole Authority v. Woodard" and Crawford-El v. Britton2 contained mild
3. "No person.., shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself..." U.S.CoNsr. amend.
V.
4. "[Njor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopirdy of life or limb. ... " U.S.
CONST. amend. V.
5. Of course, in many ways, this is also a theme of the Court's entire term. Although there were major decisions,
the Court was much quieter than it has been in recent years. See Debra Cassens, A Constitutional Siesta, ABA
JOURNAL 38 (September 1998).
6. The actual language of§ 1983 reads:
Every person who, undercolorofany statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, orusage, of any State
or Territory, District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action
at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
7. Section 1983 provides protection for "rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the constitution and laws."
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). Thus, the right at issue can be established and protected either by the U.S. Constitution or
by a federal statute. See, e.g., Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329 (1997). The cases discussed in this article all
concem alleged violations of constitutional rights, so I will concentrate on those as opposed to statutory violations.
8. 118 S. Ct. 502 (1997).
9. 118 S. Ct. 966 (1998).
10. 118 S. Ct. 2047 (1998).
11. 118S. Ct. 1244(1998).
12. 118 S. Ct. 1584 (1998).
2
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surprises, but nothing that was terribly startling.
A. The No Surprise Cases
1. Kalina v. Fletcher and Prosecutorial Immunity
Nowhere in the language of § 1983 does the statute mention that defendants
sued under it may raise a defense of immunity. The Supreme Court, however, has
interpreted § 1983 to bring with it all the relevant common law immunities that
existed at the time the statute was enacted.'3 Some defendants possess absolute
immunity from suit, some possess qualified immunity, and some possess no immunity
at all. The Court determines whether a defendant possesses an immunity defense by
looking at history, at whether such a defendant possessed a common law immunity
at the time Congress enacted § 1983.'"
Prosecutors generally possess absolute immunity from suit." The actual type
of immunity shielding a defendant in a given case, however, is dependent on the
character of the defendant's challenged action-whether it was judicial, legislative,
or executive.' 6 In other words, the courts will look at the character of the challenged
action and not solely at the defendant's job description. That means prosecutors do
not automatically possess absolute immunity by virtue of their job. Rather, they
possess absolute immunity when "initiating and pursuing a criminal prosecution."' 7
Kalina presented the Court with a straightforward opportunity to reiterate these
propositions and to clarify once again which actions by a prosecutor are protected by
absolute immunity and which are protected by only a qualified immunity.
Kalina began when a prosecutor filed three documents in a Washington state
court.I" Those three documents were an information (containing a charge of burglary
naming Rodney Fletcher as the defendant), a motion for an arrest warrant, and an
affidavit in support of the motion. 9 The prosecutor prepared all three documents.20
The first two were unsworn pleadings.2' The third one, however, by its very nature
was a sworn statement containing factual assertions.22 The prosecutor did not merely
prepare this affidavit-she was also the affiant, personally vouching for the truth of
the factsY'
The burglary charges against Fletcher were dismissed within a month (on the
13. The wisdom and accuracy of this decision has been explored by other commentators. See, e.g., Richard A.
Matasar, Personal Immunities Under Section 1983: The Limits ofthe Court's Historical Analysis, 40 ARK. L. REV.
741 (1987).
14. See Richardson v. McKnight, 117 S. Ct. 2100 (1997).
15. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
16. See, e.g., Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997).
17. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 410.
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prosecutor's motion).24 At some point thereafter, Fletcher filed a § 1983 action
against the prosecutor, claiming a violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free
from unreasonable seizures.' His complaint focused on the fact that the prosecutor's
affidavit contained two key inaccuracies.26 The prosecutor moved for summary
judgment on the basis of immunity.27 The district court denied the motion, and the
Ninth Circuit affirmed.28
The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the prosecutor was entitled
to absolute immunity. As its first step in answering this question, the Court looked
at the history and policies underlying absolute prosecutorial immunity." After
exploring those topics, the Court concluded that:
These cases make it clear that the absolute immunity that protects the prosecutor's
role as an advocate is not grounded in any special "esteem for those who perform
these functions, and certainly not from a desire to shield abuses of office, but
because any lesser degree of immunity could impair the judicial process itself."
Thus, in determining immunity, we examine "the nature of the function performed,
not the identity of the actor who performed it."'"
Once the Court reached this conclusion, its natural second step was to examine the
nature of the work at issue in the case. The prosecutor argued that the Court should
examine all three documents as a whole, as a unit.32 The Court, however, rejected
that approach and instead examined each document separately. The Court had no
trouble deciding that the prosecutor's "activities in connection with the preparation
and filing of... the information and the motion for an arrest warrant are protected
by absolute immunity." '33 The sticking point, however, was the third document, the
affidavit.
In holding that the prosecutor could not claim absolute immunity with respect
to the affidavit, the Court declared:
Although the law required that document to be sworn or certified under penalty of
perjury, neither federal nor state law made it necessary for the prosecutor to make
that certification. In doing so, petitioner performed an act that any competent
24. See Kalina v. Fletcher, 118 S. Ct. 502,505 (1997).
25. See id.
26. See id. The burglary charge arose out of the theft of some school computer equipment. In her affidavit, the
prosecutor stated that Fletcher had never possessed permission to be in the school, yet his fingerprints were on a glass
partition. In reality, Fletcher had installed partitions in the school and did have permission to be there. Second, the




29. See id. at 506.
30. See Kalina v. Fletcher, 118 S. Ct. 502,506-09 (1997).
31. Id. at 508 (citations omitted).
32. See id. at 509-10.
33. Id. at 509.
[Vol. 34.265
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witness might have performed. 4
This, indeed, is what caused the problem. The Court carefully noted that the
preparation and filing of the affidavit were protection functions;35 the problem here
was that the prosecutor went beyond mere preparation and filing and actually became
a witness. Because serving as a witness is not a traditional function of prosecutorial
advocacy, Kalina could not claim the protections of absolute immunity.36
Kalina v. Fletcher contained no surprises. In fact, the only surprise would have
been if it had been decided differently. It is still a helpful case, however, as it
provides a clear and concise example of how to break down and analyze a prosecu-
tor's actions. Such an example should help lower courts resolve claims of absolute
prosecutorial immunity.
2. Bogan v. Scott-Harris and Legislative Immunity
As mentioned above, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the type of
immunity available to a § 1983 defendant depends on the character of the defendant's
actions. Although the Court has consistently held that legislative actions warrant
absolute immunity, the Court has never explicitly addressed the situation of local
legislators. The Court remedied that lack this past term withBogan v. Scott-Harris.37
Janet Scott-Harris was the administrator and only permanent employee of Fall
River, Massachusetts Department of Health and Human Services.38 When the mayor
of Fall River prepared his 1992 budget, he proposed the elimination of the Depart-
ment of HHS.39 This would, of course, be the end of Scott-Harris' job. The City
Council Ordinance Committee, and ultimately the City Council itself, approved the
mayor's proposal.' Scott-Harris filed suit against various city officials, claiming
that her job was eliminated as a result of racial animus and in retaliation against her
for exercising her First Amendment rights.4' The issue which ultimately came before
the Supreme Court was whether the defendants' actions were protected by absolute
legislative immunity.4'
The Court began its analysis by reiterating that it looks to history and common
law to determine what type of immunity attaches to a particular type of action.4 3 As
a result of its review of both history and of the policies underlying absolute legislative
immunity, the Court had little trouble declaring that:
34. Id.
35. See id.
36. See Kalina v. Fletcher, 118 S. Ct. 502,509 (1997).
37. 118 S. Ct. 966 (1998).
38. See id. at 969.
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. See id. Specifically, Scott-Harris had prepared termination charges against a temporary HHS employee. That
temporary employee was politicallyconnected and used those connections to turn thedismissal into a 60 day suspension.
See id.
42. See id.
43. See Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 118 S. Ct. 966, 970-71 (1998).
1999]
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Because the common law accorded local legislators the same absolute immunity
it accorded legislators at other levels of government, and because the rationales for
such immunity are fully applicable to local legislators, we now hold that local
legislators are likewise absolutely immune from suit under § 1983 for their
legislative activities.'
Although the Court had never specifically addressed immunity for local legislators,
this holding was not a surprise. It fit squarely within the Court's repeated holding
that the type of immunity rests both on history and on the character of the defendant's
actions. The Court has never found that legislative actions warrant less than absolute
immunity, and there was no real reason to think that local legislators would be any
different. Indeed, the Court noted that it had implicitly reached this conclusion in its
1979 decision Lake Country Estates v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency.45
The real dispute in Bogan was not whether absolute immunity attaches to local
legislative action, but rather whether the defendants' actions were "legislative."
Scott-Harris argued that the defendants were not actually engaged in legislation;
instead, they were engaged in retaliatory, discriminatory acts targeted at a particular
individual. 46 According to Scott-Harris, these motivations meant that the defendants'
actions could not be "legislative."'47
The Supreme Court rejected this argument, stating that the Court looks only at
the nature of the challenged action; it will not "pierce" through the action to examine
motivation or intent.' This holding was no surprise. If the Court had reached the
opposite result, it would have seriously damaged the tidy analysis developed in
previous immunity cases. The "nature" of an action is relatively easy to determine.
If federal courts start probing behind the "nature" of an action to determine its
"motivation," the scheme will be infinitely more difficult to administer. In addition,
these inquiries would all but destroy the value of absolute immunity. The purpose of
absolute immunity is to save legislators the time, trouble, expense, and embarrass-
ment of litigation. Accordingly, immunity decisions need to be made as early as
possible in the litigation if they are to serve their function. Subjective inquiries into
motivations almost inevitably turn on credibility issues, which means they cannot be
made until after trial. That would defeat the purpose of the immunity and render it
a nullity.49 Consequently, it came as no surprise that the Court refused to go beyond
the "nature" of the challenged action.
Once the Court refused to look past the nature of the action, it was left
44. Id. at 970.
45. 440 U.S. 391 (1979).
46. See Bogan, 118 S. Ct. at 972.
47. Id.
48. See id. at 973.
49. Indeed, it was exactly this problem that led the Supreme Court to abandon the subjective inquiry prong of
qualified immunity. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
[Vol. 34.265
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... with the question whether, stripped of all considerations of intent and motive,
[defendants'] actions were legislative. We have little trouble concluding that they
were. Most evidently, [defendant] Roderick's acts of voting for an ordinance
were, in form, quintessentially legislative. [Defendant] Bogan's introduction of a
budget and signing into law an ordinance were also formally legislative, even
though [as the mayor] he was an executive official. We have recognized that
officials outside the legislative branch are entitled to legislative immunity when
they perform legislative functions .... Bogan's actions were legislative because
they were integral steps in the legislative process.
... We need not determine whether the formally legislative character of [defen-
dants'] actions is alone sufficient to entitle [defendants] to legislative immunity,
because here the ordinance, in substance, bore all the hallmarks of traditional
legislation. The ordinance reflected a discretionary, policymaking decision
implicating the budgetary priorities of tie city and the services the city provides
to its constituents.... Thus, [defendants'] actions were undoubtedly legislative.'
No surprise.
3. Wisconsin Department of Corrections v. Schacht and Eleventh Amendment
Immunity
The final "no surprise" decision relating to immunity and § 1983 revolves
around the interaction between the removal provisions and the states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity in particular federal court actions. In Wisconsin Department
of Corrections v. Schacht,"' Keith Schacht filed a § 1983 complaint against the
Wisconsin Department of Corrections and several of its employees.52 The case was
a pretty run-of-the-mill due process suit, with two exceptions. First, the plaintiff was
not a prisoner; he was a prison guard who was fired for stealing. Second, he filed
his complaint in state, as opposed to federal, court.53 Section 1983 does not provide
for exclusive federal jurisdiction, so state courts are fully capable of hearing these
cases. The defendants, however, opted to have a federal court hear the case, so they
exercised their right to remove the case to federal court.54 From there, the case
proceeded in a typical fashion, with the District Court ultimately granting the
defendants' motion to dismiss on some counts and their motion for summary
judgment on the others.55
The case took an interesting turn, however, on appeal to the Seventh Circuit.
That court sua sponte raised a question about the propriety of the removal.
50. Bogan, 118S. Ct. at 973.
51. 118 S. Ct.2047 (1998).
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Specifically, the court of appeals noted that the complaint contained allegations
against the state of Wisconsin.56 Because the Eleventh Amendment bars federal
courts from hearing such claims, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the "presence of
even one such claim in an otherwise removable case deprived the federal courts of
removal jurisdiction over the entire case."'57 This, then, was the question before the
Supreme Court-does the presence of a claim barred by the Eleventh Amendment
destroy removal jurisdiction?58
This seems like a strange question to even ask, but it came about due to a
bizarre Seventh Circuit argument. That court cobbled together two concepts to reach
the result that the presence of one claim barred by the Eleventh Amendment destroys
removability: first, that claims based on sovereign immunity are special; and second,
that the presence of one nondiverse party destroys diversity and renders a case
unremovable. 9
This argument is bizarre for two reasons. First, when determining the
removability of a particular lawsuit, courts use the "well pleaded complaint" rule and
look only at the complaint itself; courts do not examine possible defenses.60 The
Eleventh Amendment is generally considered to provide states with a defense against
being hauled into federal court. It must be a defense, rather than an absolute bar,
because states are free to waive it6' and courts are free to ignore it if a state does not
waive it.62 Courts are not, however, free to ignore jurisdictional defects. Thus, it
seems strange to consider an Eleventh Amendment defense in determining the
removability of Schacht's complaint. And Schacht's complaint clearly presented a
federal question. He filed suit under a federal statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and alleged
violations of his Fourteenth Amendment rights.
The Seventh Circuit's argument is also bizarre considering the relationship
between the Eleventh Amendment and § 1983's requirement that the defendant be a
"person."63 The Supreme Court's interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment has a
long and tortured history,64 but the part that is pertinent here can be stated easily. As
a definitional matter, § 1983 provides for a cause of action only against "persons.' 'S
States, state agencies, and state employees sued in their official capacity for damages
56. See id. Although Schacht did not actually name Wisconsin as a defendant, he did name a state agency, as well
as suing the individual defendants in both their personal and official capacities. Suits against state agencies are
considered the same as suits against the state itself. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989).
The same goes for official capacity suits against state employees. See id.
57. Wisconsin Dep't of Corrections v. Schacht, 118 S. Ct. 2047, 2051 (1997) (referencing Schacht v. Wisconsin
Dep't of Corrections, 116 F.3d 1151, 1152-53 (1997)).
58. See id.
59. See Schacht v. Wisconsin Dep't of Corrections, 116 F.3d 1151, 1152 (1997).
60. See Wisconsin Dep't of Corrections, 118 S. Ct. at 2053 (citing St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab
Co., 303 U.S. 283 (1938)).
61. See, e.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
62. See, e.g., Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 524 (1982).
63. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
64. See ERWINCHMERINSKY, FEDERALJURISDICTION (2d ed. 1994); Melissa L. Koehn, The NewAmerican Caste
System: The Supreme Court and Discrimination Among Civil Rights Plaintiffs, 32 MICH. J. L. REF. 49 (1998).
65. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
[Vol. 34:265
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are not "persons" under the terms of the statute.6 Thus, a federal court faced with
a plaintiff seeking monetary damages from a state agency and from state employees
in their official capacity must dismiss the case, not for Eleventh Amendment
immunity reasons, but simply because the statute does not provide a cause of action
against those defendants. This is not to say that the state does not also have an
Eleventh Amendment defense, just that a federal court will never reach it, as the case
can be resolved on non-constitutional grounds.
The relationship between the Eleventh Amendment, § 1983, and suits against
particular defendants has occasionally caused confusion for lower courts. Indeed, an
example of this confusion came before the Supreme Court during its 1996-97 term
in Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona.67 The Court, however, used that case
as a vehicle to reiterate the basic rule that states, state agencies, and state employees
sued for damages in their official capacities are not persons under § 1983. Indeed,
the Court's opinion was issued before the Seventh Circuit issued its Schacht opinion,
and the state pointed it out. The Seventh Circuit even cited Arizonans for Official
English in its Schacht opinion.68 This, perhaps, is the surprising thing-that a lower
federal court is still confused about this basic rule. The Supreme Court had no
difficulty, however, in correcting the mistake, and its decision is likely important for
that very reason.69 The Court reversed the Seventh Circuit and held that the existence
of a claim barred by the Eleventh Amendment does not destroy removability of a
complaint. As indicated, the Supreme Court's decision rested on the nature of
Eleventh Amendment immunity and the fact that defenses are not normally considered
when determining removability. The Court's decision came as no surprise, since it
constituted a simple application of well-established principles.
B. The Mild Surprise Cases
1. Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard, the Fifth Amendment, and Self-
Incrimination in Clemency Proceedings
I have placed Ohio Adult Patrol Authority v. Woodward70 under the "mild
surprise" prong, but it is a difficult case to categorize, as it raises two distinct issues.
Eugene Woodard was convicted in an Ohio state court of aggravated murder and
sentenced to death.7 ' His conviction was affirmed on direct appeal.7 2 As of 45 days
66. See Will v. Michigan Dep't State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989).
67. 520 U.S. 3 (1997).
68. See Schacht v. Wisconsin Dep't of Corrections, 116 F.3d 1151, 1153 (1997).
69. Justice Kennedy, while joining in the Court's opinion, did write a separate concurrence to emphasize that the
Court did not reach the question of whether removal constituted a waiver of the Eleventh Amendment defense. See
Wisconsin Dep't of Corrections v. Schacht, 118 S. CL 2047, 2053 (1997). His concurrence urged the Court to reach
that question in some ftiture case. See id.
70. 118S.Ct. 1244(1998).
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before his scheduled execution, Woodard had not obtained a stay of execution.73
Thus, in accordance with the procedures mandated by Ohio law, the Ohio Adult
Parole Authority commenced its clemency proceedings.74 As part of those
proceedings, Woodard was given the option of participating in an interview with the
parole board.75 No attorneys are allowed at the interview.76 Woodard filed a § 1983
suit alleging that these procedures violated his due process rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment and his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination.77
The Fifth Amendment challenge is obviously the one that fits within the
"immunity" theme of this paper. The Court issued a unanimous answer to that
question, holding that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
simply does not apply to clemency procedures.7" The self-incrimination portion of
the Fifth Amendment declares that "no person shall be compelled to be a witness
against himself. 79 That clause applies, then, only when a person is being "com-
pelled" to speak.
Nothing in Ohio's clemency procedures mandated Woodard's participation in
the interview. Indeed, those procedures explicitly stated that such participation was
voluntary."0 Thus, Woodard could not argue that compulsion existed in the
traditional sense. Instead, he argued that the compulsion worked in a more subtle
way. Because Ohio provided only one guaranteed clemency proceeding, Woodard
argued that he was forced to choose between taking full advantage of the clemency
proceeding (and possibly compromising his ongoing post conviction remedies) or
possibly forfeiting his one meaningful chance at clemency. Woodard also argued that
if he participated in the interview, he might be put in the position of having to reveal
information about other crimes for which he could still face prosecution.8 According
to Woodard, this untenable choice amounted to a "compulsion" that he take part in
the interview. 2
The Court unanimously rejected this argument, and did so in a straightforward
and unsurprising way, declaring:
It is difficult to see how a voluntary interview could "compel" [Woodard] to
speak. He merely faces a choice quite similar to the sorts of choices that a
criminal defendant must make in the course of criminal proceedings, none of which




76. See Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard, I 18 S. Ct. 1244, 1248 (1998).
77. See id.
78. See id. at 1252-53.
79. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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... In each of these situations [such as deciding whether or not to testify at
trial], there are undoubted pressures-generated by the strength of the Govern-
ment's case against him-pushing the criminal defendant to testify. But it has
never been suggested that such pressures constitute "compulsion" for Fifth
Amendment purposes.
Here, [Woodard] has the same choice of providing information to the
Authority-at the risk of damaging his case for clemency or for postconviction
relief-or of remaining silent. But this pressure to speak in the hope of improving
his chance of being granted clemency does not make the interview compelled.83
As the Court states, this conclusion follows logically from precedent. And indeed,
such precedent makes a good deal of sense in light of the purposes behind the Fifth
Amendment's protections. The State of Ohio did not force Woodard to provide, from
his own mouth, the evidence that would convict him. Instead, Woodard had an honest
choice as to whether to participate in the clemency proceedings. One alterna-
tive-participating in the hopes of at least getting his death sentence commuted-may
be more attractive than the other, but that is simply not the type of compulsion the
Fifth Amendment was designed to protect against.
If the Fifth Amendment claim had been the only issue in the case, I would have
put this discussion under the "no surprise" prong of the paper. I ultimately decided
to put it under the "mild surprise" prong as a result of the vote on the second issue
in the case-whether Ohio's clemency procedures are subject to the strictures of the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. That Clause prohibits a state from
depriving a person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.
84
Accordingly, due process protections do not exist in a vacuum; they are triggered
when a state seeks to "deprive" someone of "life, liberty, or property."85
In addition to his Fifth Amendment claim, Woodard argued that Ohio's
clemency procedures violated his due process rights. Woodard contended that his
interest in "life" was at stake during the proceedings, as the clemency process
provided an opportunity to have his death sentence commuted. This "life"interest
triggered the Due Process Clause, which Woodard argued, was violated because
(1) Ohio gave him insufficient notice of the interview and hearing;
(2) he did not have a meaningful opportunity to prepare his clemency application,
in light of the fact that his post-conviction petitions were still ongoing;
(3) his attorney was not allowed to participate in the interview and could
83. Id. at 1252-53.
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participate in the hearing only at the discretion of the parole board; and
(4) he was precluded from testifying or submitting documentary evidence at the
hearing.e
Once you examine the three opinions issued by the Court in this case and count up
the votes, you will discover that the Court decided by a 5-4 vote that the Due Process
Clause does apply to clemency procedures. 87
I found slightly surprising the four votes holding that the Due Process Clause
does not apply to such proceedings. Those four Justices rested their decision on two
basic prongs. First, they looked to prior (non-capital) cases in which the Court had
refused to find a liberty interest in clemency proceedings.88 Those prior cases had
declared that clemency is simply not the business of the courts-a petition for
clemency is a "unilateral hope" submitted to the executive branch.89 Appeals for
clemency are matters of grace and, as such, are the exclusive domain of the executive.
The second strand of the four Justices' argument centered around the nature of
Woodard's interest. The Justices in the minority felt that Woodard had no "life"
interest, and could not have a "life" interest, in the clemency procedures because, for
all intents and purposes, that interest was extinguished at his trial when he received
a death sentence. Thus, the determination as to Woodard's life "has already been
made with all required due process protections." '9 Accordingly, it could not trigger
the Due Process Clause in the clemency proceeding, especially since clemency is not
an "integral part of the.., system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of
a defendant."'
The five Justices in the majority vehemently disagreed with this approach,
declaring that "a prisoner under a death sentence remains a living person and
consequently has an interest in his life."'92 While clemency proceedings do not require
the full panoply of due process, such as at a criminal trial, they must satisfy the basic
elements of due process. 93 All five justices in the majority would reserve a role for
the courts to intervene in clemency proceedings in the event a state begins administer-
ing those proceedings in a completely arbitrary manner, such as by a coin toss. The
86. See Woodard, 118 S. Ct. at 1254 (O'Connor, J. concurring in part and in the judgment).
87. The five votes in favor of the Due Process Clause applying are found in two places: the four votes for Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion (Justices O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer) and Justice Steven's vote in his
opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. The four votes concluding that the Due Process Clause does not apply
are found in Part II of the main opinion (authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist and joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy
and Thomas).
88. See Woodard, 118 S. Ct. at 1249-50.
89. Id. at 1249 (quoting Connecticut Bd. of Pardonsv. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458,465 (1981)).
90. Id. at 1252 n.5. whiletheseJusticesconcededthat Woodarddidhavesomeresidual "life" interest, forexample
in not being summarily executed by a prison guard, he cannot invoke this interest as to the clemency proceedings. See
id. at 1250.
91. Id. at 1252 (quoting Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387,393 (1985)).
92. Id. at 1253 (O'Connor, J. concurring); see also Justice Steven's dissenting opinion stating: "There is, however,
no room for legitimate debate about whether a living person has a constitutionally protected interest in life. He
obviously does." Id. at 1255.
93. See id. at 1253-54 (O'Connor, J. concurring); id. at 1255 (Stevens, J.concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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difference between Justice Stevens and the other four Justices was how to apply this
basic requirement to Woodard. Justice Stevens agreed with the Court of Appeals'
determination that the case should be remanded to the District Court for an
evidentiary hearing as to whether Ohio's clemency procedures met the minimum
requirements of due process.94 The four other Justices, however, felt the record was
sufficient to hold that Woodard had not been deprived of due process.
95
Thus, eight Justices determined that Ohio had not violated Woodard's
constitutional rights during its clemency proceedings. The dispute between the
Justices over the applicability of the Due Process Clause was of no real significance
on the facts of this particular case. That might, however, not be true in future cases.
Future litigants can take comfort in the fact that, at least for the moment, the basic
elements of due process apply to clemency proceedings. The close vote and the
make-up of the two camps, however, is a signal that this is an issue to watch; the
Court may change directions in the future. It is also significant that four Justices on
the Court are ready and willing to take a somewhat restrictive view of the Due
Process Clause, at least in the context of the criminal justice system.
2. Crawford-El v. Britton and the Relationship Between Qualified Immunity
and Unconstitutional Motive Cases
As discussed above,9 6 the Supreme Court has interpreted § 1983 to incorporate
the vast array of common law immunities that existed at the time Congress enacted
the statute. The type of immunity available to a given defendant depends on the
nature of the challenged action. Judicial actions are shielded by absolute immunity,
as are legislative actions; executive actions, however, are covered only by a qualified
immunity. It follows, then, that most § 1983 actions are brought against those
exercising executive authority. After all, a qualified immunity defense has at least the
possibility of being defeated; an absolute immunity is insurmountable. Conse-
quently, the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts have issued a great number
of opinions defining the contours and applicability of the qualified immunity defense.
One more such opinion came from the Supreme Court last term-the decision
in Crawford-El v. Britton.9 7 Although presenting very ordinary, run of the mill,
prisoner litigation facts (the plaintiff was a vocal prisoner who filed suit against a
corrections officer alleging that she took several actions against him in retaliation for
his statements and activities), the case presented a very interesting question-the
relationship between the requirements of qualified immunity and the elements of the
underlying constitutional violation.
The current era of qualified immunity began in 1982 with the Supreme Court's
decision in Harlow v. Fitzgerald.98 Prior to Harlow, the defense of qualified
94. See Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard, 118 S. Ct. 1245, 1256-57 (1998).
95. See id. at 1254.
96. See supra text at Part I.A.I.
97. 118 S. Ct. 1584(1998).
98. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
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immunity contained both a subjective and an objective component; in other words,
a plaintiff could overcome the defense by showing either that:
(1) the defendant "knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took
within his sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights
of the [plaintiff]," or (2) "he took the action with the malicious intention to cause
a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury to the [plaintiff]."'
The second prong of this test, the subjective prong, proved to be essentially
unworkable in practice. One of the primary purposes of qualified immunity is to
protect government officials from non-meritorious suits, as these suits needlessly
waste the official's time and energy, as well as consume public money that could be
better spent. These things are wasted simply by virtue of the pretrial and trial
process; the verdict is irrelevant. Thus, to properly protect officials, these frivolous
suits must be eliminated early in the pretrial process. Otherwise, qualified immunity
has not served its purpose. Litigants and courts quickly discovered that the subjective
prong provided a quick way to circumvent a qualified immunity defense, as all a
plaintiff needed to do was allege that the defendant acted maliciously.
To resolve this difficulty, and prevent bare allegations of malice from defeating
an otherwise proper qualified immunity defense, the Supreme Court eliminated the
subjective prong of the test and reformulated a new test that was purely objective.
In Harlow, the Court held that "government officials performing discretionary
functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which
a reasonable person would have known."" Nine years later, in Siegert v. Gilley,'
the Court clarified the procedures a court should use in considering a qualified
immunity defense. According to the Court, a lower court confronted with this issue
should first determine whether one of the plaintiff's constitutional rights was
violated." z If so, the court should proceed to the second question and determine
whether that right was "clearly established" at the time of the violation in question. 3
Allegations of malice, then, are irrelevant to the second question-the qualified
immunity question. But allegations of malice or improper intent may still be relevant
to the first question-the constitutional violation. Many constitutional violations,
such as retaliation or discrimination, require a showing of improper motive on the
part of the defendant. Should some sort of heightened standard of proof be required
in these cases to avoid the same sorts of problems resolved by the Supreme Court in
Harlow? To prevent frivolous allegations of constitutional violations from
99. Crawford-El, 118 S. CL at 1591 (quoting Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308,322 (1975)).
100. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
101. 500U.S.226(1991).
102. See id. at 23 1. Or a statutory right, if that's what the suit is premised on.
103. See id. (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815). "Clearly established" has essentially become a term of art.
Although jurisdictions can differ about its exact contours, generally speaking a right is "clearly established" if it has
been decided by the relevant U.S. Court of Appeals or by the Supreme Court.
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proceeding to trial? This was the question at the heart of Crawford-El. In that case,
the D.C. Circuit Court, sitting en banc, held that a plaintiff alleging an improper
motive must prove that improper motive by clear and convincing evidence to avoid
summary judgment and to prevail at trial.
The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case and, by a 5-4 vote, reversed.'0 4 The
majority's decision rested on three basic premises. First, the Court held that the
policies supporting the elimination of the subjective prong of the qualified immunity
test are not the same policies at issue with respect to the substantive constitutional
violation. In the latter situation, countervailing concerns come into play and tip the
balance the other direction. Specifically:
While there is obvious unfairness in imposing liability-indeed, even in
compelling the defendant to bear the burdens of discovery and trial-for engaging
in conduct that was objectively reasonable when it occurred, no such unfairness
can be attributed to holding one accountable for actions that she knew, or should
have known, violated the constitutional rights of the plaintiff....
...Social costs that adequately justified the elimination of the subjective
component of an affirmative defense do not necessarily justify serious limitations
upon "the only realistic" remedy for the violation of constitutional guarantees."°5
As its second reason, the Court pointed out that there are already mechanisms in
place to prevent suits based on "bare allegations" of improper motive from
proceeding to trial. These mechanisms include causation requirements, discovery
procedures, motions to dismiss, and motions for summary judgment. t6
Third, and finally, any restrictions on the way in which improper motive suits
proceed would require "fashioning a special rule for constitutional claims that require
proof of improper intent." In light of the Court's first two reasons, that precedent
does not demand such a rule and that some procedures already exist, the majority felt
that this type of special rule required straying too far "from the traditional limits on
judicial authority."' 7 In other words, it is an activity best suited for the legislature.
And since Congress has just recently fashioned new rules for prisoner civil rights
suits,108 and those rules made no mention of special proofs in improper motive cases,
the Court should not intrude into that arena.
The four dissenters, although they did not all agree on one test, had no problem
with the Court fashioning a new test to handle improper motive cases. For their test,
104. See id. at 227. The majority opinion was written by Justice Stevens and garnered the votes of Justices Kennedy,
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justice
O'Connor. Justice Scalia also dissented, and Justice Thomas joined in his opinion.
105. Crawford-El v. Britton, 118 S. Ct. 1584, 1593 (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814).
106. See id. at 1594, 1596-98.
107. Id. at 1595.
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Justices Scalia and Thomas went so far as to say that "once the trial court finds that
the asserted grounds for the official action were objectively valid (e.g., the person
fired for alleged incompetence was indeed incompetent), it would not admit any proof
that something other than those reasonable grounds was the genuine motive (e.g., the
incompetent person fired was a Republican)."" Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
O'Connor would not have gone quite that far; they would give the plaintiff an
opportunity to prove (through objective evidence) that the proffered reason was a
pretext.t10
Although I was definitely pleased by the decision, I was a bit surprised. The
Supreme Court rarely passes up an opportunity to ratchet up the procedural
requirements in § 1983 cases, particularly when the plaintiff is a prisoner."' It is
good to see the Court draw a line and say "this is too much; this goes too far." The
decision was, however, a close call. Four justices voted for significant burdens to be
placed on plaintiffs who accuse government officials of improper motives. As the
majority pointed out, the dissenters' willingness to impose these burdens is especially
troublesome considering § 1983 was enacted in large part to curb state officials from
acting with unconstitutional motives, e.g., in racially discriminatory ways.12
Despite its victory for plaintiffs, the case, particularly the decisions by the D.C.
Circuit and the votes of the four dissenting Supreme Court Justices, demonstrates
how far the federal courts are willing to go to protect state government officials and
to create procedures to quickly "clear the decks" of § 1983 complaints. This is very
disturbing, especially in light of the fact that these suits are supposed to vindicate our
constitutional rights. While these procedural hurdles do eliminate many of the
frivolous complaints, they also take with them many meritorious complaints. Most
§ 1983 complaints are inartfully drafted, as they are filed by pro se litigants. It is
terribly easy for a pro se litigant to inadvertently sink his or her case by running afoul
of one of the complicated procedural rules that litter this area. Fortunately,
Crawford-El avoided adding one more shoal to that ocean.
I. THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IMMUNrrY DECISIONS
As mentioned earlier, two clauses in the Fifth Amendment concern immunity
issues-the Self-incrimination Clause and the Double Jeopardy Clause. The
Supreme Court decided two self-incrimination cases in its 1997-98 term. One of
those, Woodard, was about self-incrimination and clemency proceedings, and since
it arose in the context of a § 1983 action, I discussed it above. The second one
concerned the scope of the "sovereign" in the clause-to put it more specifically, can
you rely on the privilege if you are afraid of prosecution by a foreign government, or
109. Crawford-El, 118 S. Ct. at 1604 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
110. See id. (Rehnquist, CJ. dissenting).
111. See Melissa L. Koehn, The New American Caste System: The Supreme Court and Discrimination Among
Civil Rights Plaintiffs, 32 MIcH. J.L. REF. 49 (1998).
112. See Crawford-El, 118 S. Ct. at 1595 n.16.
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does it protect only against prosecutions by the federal and state governments? I
think one can probably guess the answer to this question based on the Court's past
criminal procedure decisions; therefore, I categorize it as a "no surprise" case.
The Court's double jeopardy decisions are more controversial and a bit more
surprising (although not by much); thus, I have labeled them "mild surprise" cases.
As a practical matter, though, my categorization of these three cases is somewhat
arbitrary. In all three cases, there were plausible arguments on both sides of the
litigation, and the Supreme Court resolved the disputes by applying rather narrow
interpretations of prior precedent or by overruling prior opinions. Therefore, in some
sense, all three are "mild surprise" cases and, at the same time, "no surprise" cases.
A. No Surprise-U.S. v. Balsys and the Right Against Self-Incrimination
Aloyzas Balsys immigrated to the United States in 1961. ll3 According to his
application, he served in the Lithuanian army from 1934 to 1940 and spent 1940 to
1944 in hiding. Eventually, however, the Office of Special Investigation turned its
focus on Balsys, suspecting that he might have participated in Nazi persecution
during World War II. When the OSI subpoenaed him, Balsys invoked his Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, citing a fear of prosecution in
Lithuanian, Israel, and Germany. The question, then, became whether the Fifth
Amendment's protection extends to criminal prosecutions by a foreign sovereign." 4
The Fifth Amendment provides, in relevant part, that "no person.., shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."" 5 The dispute in
Balsys centered around the meaning of the phrase "any criminal case."" 6 There was
no argument that the clause extended to Balsys, a resident alien, and that the U.S.
government was seeking to "compel" his testimony in a way that had the potential to
make him a "witness against himself." "7 There also was no dispute that Balsys' fear
of criminal prosecution, at least by Lithuania and Israel, was a reasonable fear."'
Thus, the Court was squarely faced with the question of whether the self-incrimina-
tion clause applies only to prosecutions by domestic sovereigns (e.g., the states and
the federal government) or whether it also applies to foreign criminal prosecutions.
A majority of the Court looked to the context of the clause, the history of the
privilege against self-incrimination, and the Court's own precedent to conclude that
"any criminal case" should not be interpreted literally to mean any criminal case;
instead, the phrase referred to any criminal prosecution by a sovereign within the
United States.' This conclusion did require the Court to limit its prior decision in
113. United States v. Balsys, 118 S. Ct. 2218,2221 (1998).
114. See id. at 2221-22.
115. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
116. See Balsys, 118S. Ct. at 2222-23.
117. See id.
118. See id.
119. See id. at 2222-31.
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Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of N.Y. Harbor.2' After a detailed examination
of history, however, the Court had little trouble concluding that Murphy had strayed
a bit far afield in suggesting that the Fifth Amendment's protection against self-
incrimination might reach farther than criminal prosecutions within the United States.
The Court could have stopped with this conclusion, as it would have resolved
the case. Five justices, however, went further and looked at the policies embodied in
the Self-incrimination Clause.'2 ' (Seven justices joined in the Court's historical
section, but Justices Scalia and Thomas did not join in the Court's policy analysis).
The Justices had no trouble concluding that the basic policies furthered by the Clause
were fulfilled by an interpretation that applied the Clause only to domestic criminal
prosecutions; the policies did not require the Clause to be extended any farther. 22
I have slotted Balsys as a "no surprise" case primarily because that was my
immediate reaction upon hearing the Court's verdict. When I discovered the Court
had agreed to address the question of whether the self-incrimination clause extends
to cover fear of foreign criminal prosecution, I thought, "this is a no-brainer." This
Court is certainly not inclined to extend the existing reach of any of the constitutional
criminal procedural protections. And, indeed, that was the outcome of the case.
Upon closer scrutiny, however, the issue was not quite so simple. While the
Court had not clearly faced this question before, its precedent contained sufficient
breadth to give comfort to both sides of the issue. In other words, in looking at the
prior decisions of the Court (as opposed to just looking at the issue), the decision
could have easily gone either way. Still, however, the result was predictable, given
this Court's inclination to restrict the procedural protections available to defendants
in criminal cases.
The Court's decision, though, does illustrate an important point about the
malleability of history. As a prior commentator has noted, the Court is not very good
at "doing" history.'23 Part of the reason is that a look at history rarely supplies an
easy yes or no answer. History is more complex than that, and historical actions
depend on a vast web of causes and effects. The Court's tendency to do an one-
dimensional historical analysis allows it to justify any answer it wants. That is a
dangerous way to decide cases, and an unconvincing one, as it leaves the door open
for dissenters to sift through history for evidence that supports the opposite result.
And the dissenters in Balsys, Justices Breyer and Ginsburg, did just that. So, despite
the Court's attempt to use history and policy to support its result, what we are really
left with is the realization that the Court did not want to extend the self-incrimination
clause any further, so it plucked select bits of history and policy and presented them
as the basis for the decision. Accordingly, I decided to leave this case in the "no
suprise" category.
120. 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
121. SeeBalsys, 118S. Ct. at2231-35.
122. See id.
123. See Richard A. Matasar, Personal Immunities Under Section 1983: The Limits of the Court's Historical
Analysis, 40 AR. L. REv. 741 (1987).
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B. Mild Surprise-The Double Jeopardy Decisions
The Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause states that "nor shall any
person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."'24
At its heart, then, this clause is an immunity provision. In its most basic form, the
Double Jeopardy Clause provides immunity against the rigors of a second criminal
trial. Of course, constitutional interpretation is rarely that simple, and the Court's
analysis of the Double Jeopardy Clause is no exception.
The Supreme Court has declared that, at its core, the Double Jeopardy Clause
protects against a second criminal prosecution for the same offense and against
multiple criminal punishments for the same offense (but only if the punishments are
imposed in separate proceedings)."z This interpretation set the Court on the course
of having to determine what counts as a "criminal prosecution" and what counts as
a "criminal punishment." These tasks have led the Court to develop a variety of tests
that result in a great patchwork of double jeopardy rules. 2 6 One of the most
problematic issues in recent years has been determining when a civil fine should be
counted as a criminal punishment. The Court took up that issue again this past term
in Hudson v. United States.27 The Court also addressed the scope of the double
jeopardy protections in sentencing proceedings. 28
1. Hudson v. United States and Whether a Monetary Penalty Is "Criminal"
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Double Jeopardy Clause to prohibit
multiple criminal punishments from being imposed for a single offense, provided the
punishments are imposed in successive proceedings. This interpretation has raised
the question of how to determine whether a given proceeding and a given punishment
are "criminal" and when they are merely "civil." The Double Jeopardy Clause
prohibits only multiple criminal punishments-it does not apply when one punishment
is civil and the other is criminal.
The Court has long promulgated a general, two part test for handling this
question.' 29 In the first step of the test, the Court looks at whether the legislature has
labeled the statutory provision or scheme at issue as either civil or criminal. The
Court will give a great deal of deference to the legislative label. If the legislature calls
the provision "criminal," that will be the end of the inquiry, and it will count as
"punishment" for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. If the legislature has
labeled the provision "civil," however, then the Court will continue to the second
124. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
125. See generally North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
126. The Court itself has described its double jeopardy holdings as "a veritable Sargasso Sea which could not fail
to challenge the most intrepid judicial navigator." Albemaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333,343 (1981).
127. 118 S. Ct. 488 (1997).
128. See, e.g., Mongev. California, 118 S. Ct. 2246 (1998).
129. See United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963); Rex
Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148 (1956).
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stage of the test.
In the second stage, the Court looks at whether the statutory scheme is "'so
punitive either in purpose or effect' as to 'transfor[m] what was clearly intended as
a civil remedy into a criminal penalty."" 3 In conducting this inquiry, the Court
employs a multi-factor analysis, including:
(1) "whether the sanction involves an affirmative dis ability or restraint";
(2) "whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment";
(3) "whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter";
(4) "whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punish-
ment-retribution and deterrence";
(5) "whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime";
(6) "whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be
connected is assignable for it"; and
(7) "whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose
assigned."''
Deference to the legislature is also apparent here, as this analysis must demonstrate
by the "clearest proof' that the civil remedy is actually a criminal punishment.'32
While this has been the basic rule for some time, the Court did create a small
exception to it with its 1989 decision in United States v. Halper.33 Irwin Halper was
convicted of 65 counts of filing false Medicare claims with the government. After his
criminal trial was completed, and sentence was imposed, the government began civil
proceedings against Halper for the same false claims. The civil statute essentially
provided for a statutory fine of $2,000 for each false claim. Thus, Halper was facing
a fine of $130,000 for defrauding the government of $585.
In reviewing Halper's case, the Supreme Court held that the fine was so
disproportionate to Halper's wrongdoing that it was, in essence, transformed from a
civil remedy into a criminal punishment. Since Halper had already been punished
once in a prior proceeding for the same conduct, the Double Jeopardy Clause barred
the imposition of the fine. The Court did, however, emphasize that this was a narrow
exception, applicable only in the "rare case" where the fine is overwhelming
disproportionate to the damages inflicted. 134
Despite this cautionary note, the lower federal courts were quickly faced with
a flood of cases in which litigants tried to shoehorn their fine into the Halper
exception. In Hudson v. United States, the Supreme Court said "enough." It
overruled Halper as "unworkable," thereby eliminating the Halper exception and
leaving litigants with only the basic test. 35 And while proportionality between the
130. Hudson, 118 S. Ct. at 493 (quoting Ward, 448 U.S. at 248-49; Rex Trailer, 350 U.S. at 154).
131. Id. at 493 (quoting Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168-69).
132. See id. at 494.
133. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
134. See id. at 449.
135. Hudson, 118 S. Ct. at494.
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harm and the fine is part of that test, it is only a small part of a larger test in which
courts are supposed to give great deference to legislative labels.
In abandoning Halper, however, the Court noted that litigants were not without
other protections. The Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and the
Excessive Fines Clause all exist to protect litigants from excessive and irrational
frees. 36 This reassurance, though, is not likely to prove too comforting, especially
in light of the Court's decision this term in United States v. Bajakaian.137 In
Bajakajian, the Court gave us, for the first time, an actual test to use in applying the
Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause. Two holdings in that case severely
undercut the Excessive Fines Clause's protections in these circumstances.
First, the Court noted that the Clause applies only to payments that constitute
"punishment."' 38 This holding, of course, leads right back to the deference Hudson
gives to legislative labeling. It also means that the Excessive Fines Clause is
irrelevant to the entire category of civil in rem forfeitures.
Nevertheless, this limitation did not prohibit the Clause from applying to
Bajakajian, as the fine at issue in his case was imposed as part of a criminal
sentencing proceeding and was clearly considered by the legislature to be punitive in
nature. That led the Court to its second major holding-the Court rejected any type
of strict proportionality test, and instead adopted the "standard of gross
disproportionality articulated in our Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause
precedents.' 39 The Court then proceeded to apply this test and affirm the lower
courts' decisions that the proposed fine was unconstitutional. Thus, while the
Excessive Fines Clause provides only minimal protection, we at least have an
illustration of when it is violated.
2. Monge v. California and Sentencing Proceedings
With one exception (concerning capital proceedings), the Supreme Court has
steadfastly refused to extend the protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause to
sentencing proceedings. The Court succinctly summarized the reasons for this
reluctance in Monge v. California:140
Historically, we have found double jeopardy protections inapplicable to sentencing
proceedings.... because the determinations at issue do not place a defendant in
jeopardy for an "offense." ... Nor have sentence enhancements been construed as
additional punishment for the previous offense; rather, they act to increase a
sentence "because of the manner in which [the defendant] committed the crime of
conviction."... An enhanced sentence imposed on a persistent offender thus "is
not to be viewed as either a new jeopardy or additional penalty for the earlier
136. See id. at 495.
137. 118 S. Ct. 2028 (1998).
138. See id. at 2033.
139. Id. at 2037.
140. 118 S. Ct. 2246 (1998).
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crimes" but as "a stiffened penalty for the latest crime, which is considered to be
an aggravated offense because a repetitive one....
Sentencing decisions favorable to the defendant, moreover, cannot generally
be analogized to an acquittal. We have held that where an appeals court overturns
a conviction on the ground that the prosecution proffered insufficient evidence of
guilt, that finding is comparable to an acquittal, and the Double Jeopardy Clause
precludes a second trial. Where a similar failure of proof occurs in a sentencing
proceeding, however, the analogy is inapt. The pronouncement of sentence simply
does not "have the qualities of constitutional finality that attend an acquittal."''
Thus, double jeopardy does not prohibit either resentencing or an increased
punishment on resentencing. The Court, however, has carved out one exception to
this general rule. In Bullington v. Missouri" the Court addressed the applicability
of double jeopardy to capital sentencing procedures. Bullington had been convicted
of murder at the guilt phase of his trial, but at the sentencing phase, the jury opted to
impose a life sentence rather than death. Bullington's conviction and sentence were
later reversed, however, for constitutional errors regarding jury selection. Upon
retrial, the prosecutor again sought the death penalty. The Supreme Court held that
Bullington's first penalty phase bore all the "hallmarks of [a] trial on guilt or
innocence,"' 43 so the Double Jeopardy Clause forbade the prosecutor from seeking
the death penalty a second time; instead, the prosecutor was restricted to the life
sentence imposed by the original jury.'"
The scope of the Bullington exception was at issue in the recent case of Monge
v. CaIfornia.145 That case evolved out of California's sentencing procedures.
Monge was charged and convicted of several counts involving the possession and sale
of marijuana. California sought to enhance his sentence due to his prior assault
conviction. California state law establishes a strict procedure that must be followed
before the sentencing enhancement can be applied. Specifically, "[d]efendants may
invoke the right to a jury trial, the right to confront witnesses, and the privilege
against self-incrimination; the prosecution must prove the allegations beyond a
reasonable doubt; and the rules of evidence apply."'" The trial court applied the
enhancement, but the appellate courts reversed on the grounds that the prosecutor
presented insufficient evidence to establish the relevant facts regarding the prior
conviction. 47 The question then arose as to whether the prosecutor could seek the
enhancement again, or whether that action was prohibited by the Double Jeopardy
Clause.
141. Id.
142. 451 U.S. 430 (1981).
143. Id. at 439.
144. Id.
145. Monge, 118 S. Ct. at 2246.
146. Id.
147. See id. at 2249.
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Monge argued that the Bullington exception applied to his case, as his
sentencing procedure bore all the "hallmarks" of a criminal trial and the prosecution
failed to present sufficient evidence to carry its burden.ts Eight Justices of the
Supreme Court rejected this argument and refused to extend Bullington outside the
realm of capital sentencing procedures.' 49 The majority agreed that Bullington rested
in part on the nature of the sentencing proceedings, but held that the key factor in that
case was not the nature of the procedures themselves, but rather the fact that it was
a capital sentencing procedure.150 As the Court has repeatedly stated, death is
different, and that difference mandated the result in Bullington.'5' Accordingly, the
Bullington rule is not applicable in noncapital sentencing proceedings, and the
Double Jeopardy Clause therefore does not prevent California from seeking a second
time to enhance Monge's sentence.
Justice Stevens dissented from this holding, arguing that the purpose of the
Double Jeopardy Clause is to prevent the prosecution from having a "second bite" at
the apple when the error at the first trial was caused by a failure of proof.'52 His was
the sole voice, however, for this conclusion. The surprising opinion was not Justice
Stevens', but rather the dissenting opinion of Justice Scalia, who was joined by
Justices Souter and Ginsburg.
Those three justices argued that the Double Jeopardy Clause should apply to
California's attempt to enhance Monge's sentence, although not for the reasons
Monge argued.5 3 Rather, they took issue with whether the enhancement was really
a "sentencing proceeding" or whether it was essentially an element of the crime. As
pointed out in the dissent, California's criminal code "is full of 'sentencing enhance-
ments' that look exactly like separate crimes, and that expose the defendant to
additional maximum punishment."' 54 By labeling these elements "sentencing
enhancements," California was successful in preventing the double jeopardy
protections from reaching them. The dissenters feared that this was the first step in
a trend of moving critical components of proof to the sentencing phase to avoid the
applicability of the various criminal procedural protections. Accordingly, the
dissenters would look past the legislative label of "sentencing" to reach what is
actually happening. Because the "enhancement" in Monge's case looked more like
an element of the crime, the dissenters would have applied the Double Jeopardy
Clause and prevented a retrial.' 5
148. See id.
149. Four justices joined in Justice O'Connor's majority opinion (Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy,
ThomasandBreyer). TwoJustices (Souterand Ginsburg)joined in Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion,which disagreed
with the majority's result, but not its reasoning on this issue.
150. See id.
151. See Monge v. California, 118 S. Ct. 2246,2252-53 (1998).
152. See id. at 2253-54 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
153. See id. at 2255-57.
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IH. CONCLUSION
As far as the immunity decisions go, then, the Supreme Court did not unveil any
big surprises this past term. That is not, however, necessarily a bad thing. The
Supreme Court used most of its immunity decisions this past term to clarify its prior
precedent and to illustrate how to apply the established law to particular circum-
stances. Academics, lawyers, and lower federal courts often complain that the Court
issues sweeping pronouncements with little care or concern for those who must
struggle to turn broad statements into practical rules of decision. We should not,
then, complain when the Court eschews the broad policy pronouncements in favor of
practical guidance.
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